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The nature of property rights regimes has great influence on 
patterns of water and other natural resource development, and 
hence on economic development in general. Although in 
capitalist societies property rights are predominantly "private," 
their actual form and content are shaped by a wide range of 
political, economic, legal, and social institutions, so that the 
boundary between "public" and "private" is often very hard to 
define. The case of water is especially problematic; its peculiar 
physical characteristics mean that private rights are typically 
rights to me rather than ownership, and the need for public 
regulation to coordinate users is inescapable. In addition it is 
commonly believed that water rights regimes are much affected 
by geographic conditions: primarily whether the climate is wet 
or dry. This paper presents a North American case study of 
property rights and State involvement in water development that 
has several features similar to contemporary Latin America: 
geographic contrasts, economic transformation from agricultural 
to urban/industrial development, and politicai conflict over the 
role of the State and the iimits of private property. The case is 
that of the State of Washington from the late 19th century to the 
Second World War, characterized by two contradictory water 
rights doctrines and a dramatically changing balance between 
irrigation and hydroelectricity. Several general lessons for 
the Latin American region can be drawn from this case: 
i) geographic conditions are much less important to legal 
doctrine and institutions than the redefinition and security of 
private rights needed to stimulate capital investment; ii) the 
importance of water development for regional economic growth 
depends on State involvement to overcome the limitations of the 
private sector; iii) private property can take several different 
and incompatible forms: a point which both its proponents and 
critics often ignore; iv) a private property regime geared to 
dynamic economic development can only be established and 
maintained with the active support of State intervention and 
administration, and v) such a regime can so effectively overcome 
the geographic and social obstacles presented by Nature to 
private property that the legal and institutional reforms needed to 
ensure "environmentally sustainable deveiopment" will probably 
have to be more fundamental than is often supposed.
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I
introduction
In Latin America and elsewhere, the nature of 
property rights regimes has great influence on pat­
terns of water and other natural resource develop­
ment, and hence on regional economic development 
in general. In capitalist societies, of course, property 
rights are predominantly "private," but their actual 
form and content are shaped by a wide range of pol­
itical, economic, legal and social institutions. How to 
define the boundary and relations between "public" 
and "private" thus becomes a crucial and contested 
question.
In the case of water the question is particularly 
complicated. In part this reflects water's physical na­
ture -its mobility, fluidity, versatility and vital import­
ance give it an inherently public character. Property 
rights regarding water are also affected by different 
geographic conditions. The question of whether the 
climate is arid or humid is widely believed to exert a 
strong influence on water rights regimes: the scarcity 
or abundance of water influences which land uses or 
other economic activities are most feasible, and this 
in tum influences legal rules on water use and control. 
This belief may become a sort of "environmental 
determinism", according to which societies in arid 
climates the world over tend to develop similar sys­
tems of water law which differ markedly from those 
developed by societies in humid climates.
The premise of this paper is that Latin American 
policy-makers can draw some important conclusions 
about property rights and the role of the State in water 
resource development from a case study of what hap­
pened in the State of Washington from the late 19th 
century to the Second World War. Despite the evident 
differences, this case presents several features that are 
sufficiently similar to contemporary Latin American 
conditions to be useful: geographic variability and 
contrasts; economic transformation from primarily 
agricultural and resource-extractive activities to more 
urban and industrial development; and political con­
flict over the proper role for the State in this process 
and over the nature and limits of private property 
rights. While the study is limited to water resources, it 
is suggested that it offers more general lessons about 
the relation between private property and the State, 
and about the prospects for environmental sustaina­
bility under conditions of capitalist development.
II
Water resource development and 
poHcy issues in Latin America
Latin America is characterized by wide variations of 
environmental and climatic conditions. This is so not 
only between different nations -e.g., Mexico is gener­
ally more arid than Brazil- but also within nations, as 
nearly all of them have both arid and humid regions 
-e.g., northern vs. southern Mexico, western vs. east­
ern Argentina, etc. Such variety, when combined with 
the geographic distribution of different economic ac­
tivities, leads to a wide range of supply and demand
* By "regime" I mean both the lega) conception of property rights 
themseives, as weli as the associated complex of pubiic institu­
tions through which such rights are concreteiy expressed. 
conditions for water resources, and hence of problems 
for water law, policy, and management.
Notwithstanding such variety, there arc several 
economic, social and political factors that are com­
mon to water resource issues in most of Latin Ameri­
ca. As identified in a United Nations analysis in 1980, 
these factors are: growth in both population and econ­
omic production; increasing urbanization (i.c., geo­
graphic concentration of development); water 
resources which are abundant but typically distant 
from population centres; rapid adoption of modern 
technology; and centralization of both political and 
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economic power and decision-making. These com­
bine to produce two principal kinds of water resource 
problems: i) problems of quantity, regulation of flow, 
and water and land use conflicts; and ii) urban 
problems of bad water quality, especially associated 
with poverty (United Nations/ECLAC/UNEP, 1980). 
This and subsequent analyses have shown the need 
for more integrated institutional operations, more 
equitable distribution of both costs and benefits of 
water development, and more effective and participa­
tory long-term planning (see also ECLAC, 1989). 
Reaching any of these objectives will depend in large 
part on the nature of property rights regimes and the 
role of the State. 2
HI
Contradictions between private property 
and economic deveiopment
Private property is an idea and institution that has 
been much argued and fought over. Both its propo­
nents and critics, however, have often failed to distin­
guish among different kinds of and justifications for 
private property, thereby mixing together arguments 
that are not always compatible and may even be 
contradictory.
The classic political argument, for example, is 
that private property is the best guarantee of individ­
ual liberty, delimiting a private sphere of activity 
within which State intervention is prohibited. This ar­
gument may also have moral or philosophical aspects, 
since such liberty includes the right to individual self­
expression, free will, and the like (Ramos, 1991). The 
classic economic arguments are twofold, but need not 
go together: the first is that private property stimu­
lates production and productivity by giving rights- 
holders incentives both to labour and to invest wealth, 
since they are guaranteed the fruits of their activities. 
The second is that such property is vital to the oper­
ation of markets, since the exchange of goods and 
services is impossible unless people have exclusive 
and alienable rights to their possession."*  Note that 
these two arguments, although commonly associated, 
are logically independent since production incentives 
do not necessarily imply a market economy.
These political and economic arguments come 
into fundamental conflict when a private property 
regime is combined with rapid economic growth and 
industrialization. Under such dynamic conditions of 
capitalist development, the need for security of exist­
ing private rights clashes with the demand for econ­
omic and technological change, which involves newer 
claims to resources. This has been the case in many 
parts of Latin America during the 20th century, espe­
cially since the Second World War, and is also clearly 
illustrated by the example of the 19th century United 
States. During that century U.S. law underwent a fun­
damental transformation, from a system of customary 
rules inherited from England, based on substantive 
notions such as "fairness" and "equity," to a utilita­
rian conception in which laws were used as policy 
instruments to stimulate economic expansion. Such 
diverse areas of law as property, contracts, torts, and 
corporations were reshaped to free private initiative 
from its traditional social obligations, to promote 
what the legal historian Willard Hurst called the "re­
lease of creative energy." Property law in particular 
lost its traditionally static character, rooted in protect­
ing the "quiet enjoyment" of land ownership, to 
become both more dynamic and more abstract: exist­
ing vested rights were increasingly disregarded in 
favor of newer commercial ventures, which helped to
this paper ! am concerned with issues of water quantity 
rather than quality; nonetheless, many of my conclusions are 
directly applicable to the latter as well, in that they deal with the 
relation between State authority and different kinds of private 
property rights.
3 Useful surveys of property theory are given in MacPherson 
(ed.), 1978 and Reeve, 1986.
4 The North American "law and economics" school argues, 
therefore, that the principal function of property law shouid be to 
remove obstacles to private bargaining, thereby increasing econ­
omic efficiency through market mechanisms. This requires that 
property rights be exclusive, transferrable, and universal, i.e., 
that as many things as possible be treated as pure commodities. 
See Ackerman (ed.), 1975, Cooter and Ulen, 1988, and Posner, 
1977.
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fuel economic expansion. Water rights, as we will see 
below, played a leading role in this transformation.
These changes in property law resulted from 
repeated State intervention. The chronic scarcity of 
capital in the 19th century U.S. induced state and 
national legislatures to grant special legal privileges 
to any private interests that would stimulate econ­
omic development, e.g. by building infrastructure 
-roads, canals, bridges, etc - or by exploiting natu­
ral resources in the public domain. Prominent 
among these "legal subsidies" to private parties was 
the grant of the government's eminent domain 
powers, which allowed the expropriation of private 
property when necessary for a "public use" or "public 
purpose." 6 Despite their usual protection of vested 
rights, the courts supported this legislative policy 
because of the shared conviction that economic 
growth was a "public purpose" regardless of the dis­
tributional consequences (Scheiber, 1973; Scheiber 
and McCurdy, 1975). By the end of the century, 
however, legal policies of this sort had resulted in 
such concentration of economic and political power, 
and therefore social tension and inequality, that 
reform movements were able to modify the legal 
system in the direction of increased public regulation 
(Hurst, 1956).
IV
Water as a problem for private property regimes
Water is a substance whose peculiar characteristics 
blur the public/private distinction and pose serious 
problems for private property as usually understood. 
"Water is life" -vital to biological survival and to a 
wide range of economic and social activities. Its fluidity 
and mobility link together different ecosystems while 
making it hard to capture and hold. The physical con­
nections are unavoidable: how someone uses water in 
one part of a hydrologic system directly or indirectly 
affects how other people use it somewhere else.
Because of these physical and social charac­
teristics, private rights regarding water have nearly 
always been defined as rights to use rather than 
ownership, with the latter remaining public. Different 
people may have use-rights to the same "parcel" of 
water at different times or places in a hydrologic sys­
tem. Water rights are thus fundamentally conditional 
rather than exclusive, fitting into a set of relationships 
that express overlapping claims to the uses and
$ The major references for this iegat transformation are Horwitz, 
1977 and Hurst, 1956. Two additional comments of Hurst's are 
particuiariy interesting: he argued that private property, after 
having been primariiy a poiiticai idea in the 18th century, be­
came primaniy an economic idea in the 19th; and he expiained 
the overa!! tegal evolution by pointing to the market as the domi­
nant image and idea of 19th century U.S. society.
By the "abstract" nature of property I refer to the increasingiy 
universa! tendency, by the late 19th century and beyond, to rec­
ognize claims to natural resources based on stock and bond 
ownership, debt and credit instruments, and so forth, rather than 
concrete use or other direct activity. See the essays coilected in 
MacPherson (ed.), 1978.
benefits of a shared resource. Such rights are hard 
to treat as commodities or to subject to market mech­
anisms, since exchanges usually affect other rights- 
holders who are not part of the immediate deal. 7 
Use-rights in general, therefore, can be seen as an 
inherently non-capitalist form of property (Mac­
Pherson (ed.), 1978) -inherently, but not inalterably, 
as I will argue below. 8
6 This must not be confused with the doctrine of t/ow/tro 
emmenie found in some Latin American countries, which refers 
to inalienable public/State ownership of certain key resources, 
particuiariy minerals. The U.S. usage refers to the State's power 
to take private property for public purposes subject to the pay­
ment of compensation.
7 These third-party effects have led one prominent "law and 
economics" figure from the University of Chicago to argue 
that water is an exception to the principle that property should 
be shaped by and for the market (Posner, 1977). See also Mac­
pherson (ed.), 1978 and Reeve, 1986.
& The probiems posed by water use-rights, far from being limited 
to water, indicate a deeper weakness in the neo-classical theory 
that forms the basis of the North American "law and economics" 
school (or the so-called "property rights" school): the definition 
of va/ue, Neo-classical economists assume that "vaiue" means 
"market or exchange value," and argue that it is changes in such 
value that force changes in property rights regimes. Recent work 
in the "institutions! economics" tradition, in contrast, argues 
the reverse, i.e., that changes in property relations, expressed 
through legal, poiiticai and economic processes, determine how 
value is defined. Both schools of thought agree, however, that 
how market institutions work depends on property arrange­
ments set up See Bardhan, 1989; Bromley, 1982;
MacPherson (ed.), 1978, and Reeve, 1986.
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Besides the juridical fact of public owner­
ship, the practical need for coordination and control 
of water uses is also evident. Some form of public 
regulation is thus both indispensable and legitimate. 
"Public/' however, can mean different things and 
different scales, from a local community organization 
to a centralized State. The institutions in question 
may be predominantly political, administrative, 
judicial, or even religious or cultural in nature. These 
different possibilities have markedly different effects 
on the way decisions are made and conflicts re­
solved, on what kinds of arguments are brought to 
bear, and on how different social groups can influence 
the process.
Y
Water rights doctrines in the 19th 
century United States
The history of U.S. water rights law illustrates the 
wider 19th century transformation of property men­
tioned above, as well as the influence of different 
climatic conditions on such rights. The following 
summary will set the stage for the case study that 
makes up the next part of this paper.
Upon winning national independence, for reasons 
of utility and shared cultural heritage the U.S. initially 
adopted almost the entire body of English common 
law, including water rights law. 9 The English legal 
tradition had developed the doctrine of riparian wafer 
rigA^y, according to which any owner of riparian land 
-i.e. land bordering or containing a water-body such 
as a stream, river, or lake- had the right to use that 
water. This riparian right was a private property right 
which derived from, and was supplemental to, the 
ownership of land. But because all riparian land­
owners, regardless of amount of property or date of 
title, had an equal right to use the water touching their 
land, the courts developed rules prohibiting them 
from consuming it without returning it, and mandat­
ing its equal sharing among all rights-holders. Since 
both Britain and Eastern North America were humid 
regions, agriculture and livestock raising could rely 
on rainfall, and the main uses of water resources until 
the 19th century were for navigation and fisheries; 
both of these required continued and uninterrupted
9 This did not include constitutions! !aw, of course, which did not 
exist in Engtand; in this area Americans deveioped an innovative 
federai system, distinctive reiationships among the iegisiative, 
judiciai, executive, and iater administrative branches of govern­
ment, and a Bitt of Rights.
flow, which was guaranteed by the so-called "natural 
flow" doctrine. In this way the riparian doctrine 
expressed values of social equality and cooperation 
-at least among property owners- and "an attitude of 
non-interference with nature....[which] therefore was 
biased against economic development." (Worster, 
1985, p.88)
It was this bias against development that gave 
water rights their leading role in the transformation of 
American property law. Beginning in the 18th cen­
tury, the Industrial Revolution generated an increas­
ing demand for water-power for use in the expanding 
grain, saw, and textile mills, as well as iron foundries. 
Developing water-power required building dams that 
blocked natural streamflow and created reservoirs, 
then letting the water through at irregular intervals. 
Since this was a clear violation of others' riparian 
rights, both upstream and downstream, for many 
years the courts routinely ruled against mill-owners in 
lawsuits; by the late 18th and early 19th centuries, 
however, they came to approve new state legislation 
that gave power developers priority over riparian 
landowners. This change of policy and principle was 
justified by the utilitarian concern to promote indus­
trialization and economic growth (Horwitz, 1977; 
Scheiber, 1973).
Aside from this modification the riparian doctrine 
retained its key features of prohibiting off-stream con­
sumption and ensuring equal sharing of available water. 
In the arid West, however, these rules in turn became 
major obstacles to development after 1850, as the 
westward march of European American settlement 
reached the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains, and 
the Gold Rush sparked migration to California. In all 
of those places agriculture required irrigation, which 
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was impossible if consumptive water use was pro­
hibited, and in any case precipitation was so scarce 
and unpredictable that equal sharing made water 
rights very uncertain. These were serious disincen­
tives to annual cultivation, let alone investment in ca­
nals and other irrigation works. As a result, in the 
1870s and 1880s a new doctrine known as "prior 
appropriation" was developed in the Western United 
States, under which water rights referred to specific 
quantities of water, which could be consumed off- 
stream and which were ranked in order of priority 
according the principle "First in time is first in 
right."!" in this way, at least the earliest ("senior**)  
appropriates had secure claims in all but the worst 
drought years, and more junior appropriates worked 
down the order of priority each season until there 
was no water left. These rights were private property 
and, unlike riparian rights, could be bought and sold 
independently of land ownership.
The most common explanation of the spread of 
the appropriation doctrine throughout the Western 
U.S. is the classic environmental argument: the 
change in property rights was required by the needs 
of agriculture in an arid climate, showing the prag­
matic ingenuity of the American pioneer (Webb, 
1931). The associated changes in State administrative 
structure, if mentioned at all, are generally considered 
secondary (Dunbar, 1983). In the Allowing case 
study I will argue that this interpretation is wrong on 
both counts: it overstates the importance of climate, 
while it understates the changed role of the State and 
ignores the ways in which the new regime overcame 
some of the obstacles presented by water to capitalist 
forms of property.
VI
North American case study:
Washington State, 1890 -1940
The State of Washington, from the late 19th to mid- 
20th centuries, provides an especially useful illustra­
tion of the legal, geographic and political/economic 
issues discussed above. Located on the Northwest 
coast of the U.S., it contains both humid and arid 
sections, divided by the Cascade Mountains: the for­
mer lie between that range and the Pacific Ocean, 
while the latter stretch east from that range to the 
Northern Rocky Mountains of Idaho. Conflicts arose 
from the contrasting climatic conditions and from dis­
agreement over the legitimacy of different forms of 
private property, as for several decades the State 
maintained botA the riparian and appropriation water 
rights doctrines simultaneously, abandoning the for­
mer much later than other Western states. The out­
come of these conflicts was a property regime 
designed to maximize capital investment, whose 
¡functioning depended on comprehensive State admin­
istration. During the same period the new technology 
of hydroelectricity emerged and grew rapidly, al­
though State policy and intervention in water resource 
development remained preoccupied with irrigation. 
The eventual transformation of this State role both 
responded to, and had a major impact on, the pattern 
of regional economic development.
1. ConfHcttng water rights doctrines and the 
move towards administrative rationalization
Washington's contradictory approach to water 
rights was established in 1889, the year it be­
came a state, and in part involved an institutional 
conflict between the legislature and the courts. The 
legislature responded to demands from irrigators 
and to the example of other Western states by de­
claring that water use-rights "may be acquired by 
appropriation, and as between appropriations 
the first in time is the first in right." When
to This principle had its roots in California mining claims, in 
which private individuals competed for parts of the public do­
main (Pisani, 1984).
1*  focus on Washington Stare law, not Federal law, for two 
reasons: i) under the U S. Constitution non-navigable waters 
fall under the fonner's jurisdiction; and ti) State law provides a 
more accurate picture of local and regional dynamics.
^Laws of 1889-1890; Laws of 1891, Chap. 142. 
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adopting its Constitution, however, Washington fol­
lowed the usual practice of adopting the existing 
body of English and American common law, which 
included the riparian doctrine of water rights. Thus, 
the State Supreme Court, as guardian of the Con­
stitution, refused to recognize appropriation rights 
except in respect of waters on Federal public lands, 
where such rights were recognized by national law. * 
Although legally consistent, this distinction became a 
*3 See, for example, Teaem DAcA Company v. TA arpe (1889) 20 
Pac 588; Rigney v. Tacoma LtgAt and Water Company (1894) 38 
Pac 147. The Federal laws were the Mining Acts of 1866 and 
1870 and the Desert Land Act of 1877. In this and other notes, 
the abbreviation "Pac" refers to judgments of the Supreme Court 
of the State of Washington compiled in the official Western U.S. 
review of jurisprudence, TAe Poetic Reporter (National Reporter 
System - State Series, St. Paul, West Publishing Co.). The num­
ber before the abbreviation indicates the volume and the number 
after, the page.
apearon v. JoAncax (1897), 49 Pac 495, 496-7.
instate ex re/ Liberty LaAe /rr/gadoa Company v. Saperior 
Coart of RpoAaae County (1907) 91 Pac 968, 970.
nightmare in the arid eastern part of the state, where 
most watersheds contained both public and private 
lands. Repeated lawsuits asked the Court to aban­
don the riparian doctrine as "not applicable to the arid 
portions of the state," but in an 1897 landmark 
case the Court rejected this environmental argument, 
holding that:
"It certainly cannot be true that a difference in 
climatic conditions or geographical position can 
operate to deprive one of a right of property vested in 
him by a well-settled rule of common law." *4
Nonetheless, the Court showed its desire to 
encourage irrigation by developing the principles of 
"reasonable" and "beneficial" use in the early 1900s. 
With "reasonable use", the Court modified the ripa­
rian doctrine's "natural flow" requirement to allow 
riparian rights-holders to divert and consume some 
water for irrigation; with "beneficial use" it went 
further by allowing non-riparians to claim riparians' 
unused water rights, explaining:
"It is not to the state's interest that the water of a 
non-navigable stream should be idle or going to waste 
because one of its citizens, having a preference right 
to its use, unjustifiably neglects to avail himself there­
of, while others stand ready and willing, if permitted, 
to apply it to the irrigation of their arid lands." *5
Riparians objected strongly, of course, but the 
Court repeatedly asserted "the necessity of beneficial 
use by the riparian owner," contradicting its geo­
graphic reasoning quoted above (see footnote 14) by 
saying that this met "the general needs and welfare of 
the state, especially in the arid and semi-arid regions," 
and "deprived no one of any rights which he may 
justly claim."16
Despite these judicial decisions, after 1900 there 
were a series of political attempts to clarify the situ­
ation by adopting a State Water Code based on the 
appropriation doctrine. The main forces behind the 
proposal were irrigation interests in eastern Wash­
ington (including the U.S. Reclamation Service, see 
below), who argued that new investment and develop­
ment, which depended especially on Eastern capital, 
was prevented by the uncertainty of water rights and 
the open-ended claims of riparians to future water 
use. The Chairman of the Governor's Water Code 
Commission, ibr example, criticized the inaction of 
such riparians and said, "It should be the privilege of 
other people to appropriate and make use of all water 
then running to the sea and doing nobody any good." 
An attorney on the Commission agreed:
"In this Western country we have claimed that 
/Ac proper me of wafer M wAai a ngAiy ^AoaM 
he based on. He should not be permitted to let it run 
by just because it is pretty to look at or to let ducks 
swim in it, but some ben^fteta/ ase should be made of 
it." He added that "the needs of eastern Washington 
are based on one theory, to wit, irrigation, [while] the 
needs of... western Washington are based on the use 
of water for power, logging, etc. So we have two 
divergent interests in water matters in this state."
But the political geography was not so simple. 
The reform efforts were defeated again and again in 
the Washington legislature from 1905 to 1917, by op­
ponents arguing that such a Code would unconstitu­
tionally expropriate riparians' vested property rights, 
without compensation. This objection was so well- 
founded that it troubled even lawyers who favoured 
the Code. In addition to riparian landowners in
i^Browa v. CAo^e (1923), 217 Pac 23, 25-26; Proctor v. SAn 
(1925), 236 Pac 114, 118. "Beneficia} use" has been defined as 
"in an exclusive manner so as to reap an economic as distin­
guished from an aesthetic benefit." (Morris, 1956, p. 258).
I? Letter dated 2 October 1913 to Governor Lister; address by 
I P. Engtehart to the Washington irrigation Institute, 1914, both 
in Governor Lister's Papers, which are to be found in the 
Washington State Government Archives, Olympia, Washington - 
(emphasis added by the author).
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western Washington, many of the Code's most active 
opponents were in fact irrigators in casern Washing­
ton who had invested heavily in riparian land and 
stood to lose much of their property's value if their 
riparian water rights were no longer protected. Most 
of their prominent spokesmen were lawyers and busi­
nessmen from the eastern city of Spokane. As one of 
them protested to the Governor, "There is no farmer 
in the state of Washington but what is attacked by this 
procedure." 18
The position of hydroelectric power interests was 
also more ambivalent than it first appeared. Since 
their water use was non-consumptive, they initially 
preferred the riparian doctrine, and helped to defeat 
some early versions of the Code (Dunbar, 1983). 
Most power development had taken place in humid 
western Washington, where the riparian doctrine had 
not presented serious obstacles; although constrained 
by the rights of both upstream and downstream ripa­
rians, power developers could buy those rights if 
necessary, and the courts consistently supported 
their exercise for power generation. A 1913 decision 
is illustrative:
"Where power is desired the rule [guaranteeing 
natural flow] must yield to the necessity of gathering 
the water into reservoirs.... Each owner is entitled 
to a reasonable use, and any interruption in the flow 
unavoidable by a reasonable and proper use is 
permissible."
But power developers in eastern Washington had 
had no trouble under the appropriation doctrine either. 
From 1889 the courts had recognized their claims to 
waters on public lands, and given them priority over 
junior appropriators who were irrigators. 20 Appropri­
ation rights had the added advantage of being free, as 
long as there was water available, whereas riparian 
rights could be secured only by land ownership or by 
purchase from existing landowners. As a result, a 
number of riparian spokesmen believed the power in­
terests to be secretly in favour of the appropriation 
doctrine, since "it would give them all the water 
rights on non-navigable streams which they now have 
to pay for." 21
The constitutional argument over property rights 
was finally resolved in 1917, when the legislature 
passed a misleading compromise and put its future 
resolution in the hands of a new state administrative 
agency. The 1917 Water Code adopted the appropria­
tion doctrine as state law, while inconsistently declar­
ing that this did not "lessen, enlarge, or modify the 
existing rights of any riparian owner." Those rights, 
however, became subject to condemnation (expropri­
ation) by other water users, and the requirement of 
"beneficial use" was made statutory. The most im­
portant change was the creation and unprecedented 
authority of the Office of the State Hydraulic Engin­
eer. This had a number of administrative powers and 
duties: to review requests for appropriation water 
rights and issue permits, free of charge, to those 
whose requests were granted (i.e., if there was water 
available); to keep a central record of water rights and 
usage; to supervise stream diversions according to es­
tablished rights; to gather hydrologic data to aid in 
water resource planning; to inspect the engineering 
safety of dams, canals, and related infrastructure; and 
-most controversial of all- to take over the courts' 
function of determining water rights in the event of 
conflicts.
This adjudicative authority was soon challenged 
in court as unconstitutional. Irrigators whose rights 
had been denied in one such conflict argued that the 
Code unconstitutionally gave the State Engineer both 
executive and judicial powers, and that his decision 
was an uncompensated taking of private property. In 
1921 the State Supreme Court strongly disagreed:
[The Code] "was intended to cover the whole 
field of irrigation and correct the abuses inherent in 
earlier irrigation methods. [It] appears to be broad 
enough to include almost any conceivable rights with 
reference to irrigation....[and] authorizes the hydraulic 
engineer to control all of the waters of the state for 
irrigation purposes."
2*  See letters dated 27 January 1913, 14 February 1913 and 8 
January 1915, in Governor Lister's Papers. Emphasis in 
originai. These letters describe the case of a planned irrigation 
project in the eastern Cascades which had been blocked because 
speculators in power development had appropriated the 
necessary water.
*8 Wilbur Yearsley, letter dated 4 March 1913, in Governor 
Lister's Papers.
*9 Samner Lamber and SAmg/e Company v, Pacr/ic Power and 
Compa/iy (1913), 131 Pac 220, 224. See also an earlier 
case in which a sawmill was awarded substantial damages when 
an upstream municipality reduced the flow: "Whatever of 
benefit, whether of power or otherwise, comes from the flow of 
water in the channel of a natural stream, is a matter of property, 
and belongs to the riparian owner, and is protected in law just as 
fully as the land which he owns." Cáy o/jVew WAafcom y. Pa/r- 
Aave/i Land Company (1901), 64 Pac 735, 740.
20See, for example, Pl/L v. Pomeroy /mprovemewr Company 
(1889), 21 Pac 27; v, Rid/ (1913), 135 Pac 489.
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Two years later the Court confirmed that:
"The Water Code saves all existing rights in land 
and water.. That, however, does not militate against 
the right of the state, in the exercise of a supervisory 
control, of administering the use of water for the pub­
lic welfare."
The Court was equally deferential in 1930 when 
the legislature amended the Code to specifically men­
tion hydroelectricity (for the first time), and gave the 
State Engineer the power to decide conflicts between 
hydroelectric development and other water uses. 22 
Thus a water rights system which had originally been 
designed mainly for irrigation (a consumptive use) 
proved to be equally suited to hydroelectric power (a 
non-consumptive use), despite their apparently con­
tradictory needs.
In conclusion, the climatic differences proved to 
be more important to the initial debates over water 
rights doctrines than to the institutional structure that 
eventually resulted. The strength of the state gov­
ernment's commitment to the new system is highly 
significant. The legislative and judicial response to 
the legal protests was so firm and unified that the 
Code and the appropriation doctrine ceased to be 
an issue in Washington politics within a few 
years. In particular, business groups and capitalists 
interested in water resources were untroubled by the 
new state administrative role, and evidently con­
sidered it both to serve their interests and to promote 
an acceptable model of economic growth. The event­
ual decision of the power companies to stop opposing 
the Code can be understood in the same way: they 
wanted an end to the confusion and had a strong stake 
in overall regional economic investment and growth. 
The system of state permits to use water was a move 
toward centralized administrative control, and away 
from the judiciary with its traditional concern for pri­
vate rights, but it solved part of the "problem" of 
private property in water. Water rights were still 
rights, but they were now more secure and predictable 
than they had been before, and thereby encouraged 
private investment.
2. Evotutton of State intervention in irrigation and 
power development
Shortly after the rationalization of water rights law in 
the mid 1920s, the nature of governmental interven­
tion in irrigation and hydroelectric development 
underwent a transition. Intervention in these two 
forms of water use differed greatly and evolved slow­
ly during the period from 1890 to 1930, with very 
similar patterns at local, state, and Federal levels. For 
most of this period the amount of intervention was 
inversely related to the sector's economic vitality: 
that is, it was early and important in the case of irrig­
ation, whose performance disappointed most hopes, 
and bitterly contested in energy production, whose 
growth exceeded all expectations. This reflected the 
traditional North American belief that the State 
should stay out of all economic activity in which pri­
vate enterprise could make a profit. These priorities 
began to be reversed in the 1920s, a period of grow­
ing political and economic crisis in U.S. capitalism.
¿3) policies i/i e/H/Kcn? /aw (<npra-
pnafKM qf privare properry)
The Washington legislature, like that of other states, 
regularly tried to facilitate economic development by 
delegating its eminent domain power -i.e., the power 
to expropriate or "condemn" private property, with 
compensation- to certain private enterprises (sec sec­
tion III above). On constitutional grounds, the courts 
would not approve this unless it was for a "public use 
or purpose," which over a 25-year period the State 
Supreme Court interpreted in such a way as to estab­
lish a clear preference for irrigation over hydroelec­
tric development.
In 1899 the legislature passed companion statutes 
(Chapters 130 and 131) giving both lumber companies 
and irrigators the power to condemn property as needed 
for rights-of-way. In 1903, in its first major decision 
in this area, the Court overturned the former statute 
and flatly rejected the argument that an expanding 
private lumber industry generated "public" benefits:
"It cannot be that, within the meaning of the 
Constitution, the distinction between public policy 
and public use is to be obliterated.... The use under 
consideration must be either a use by the public, or by 
some agency which is quasi-public, and not simply a 
use which may incidentally or indirectly promote the 
public interest or general prosperity of the state." 23
^//co/y C<9/Hpa"y r. Aforré (1903), 74 Pac 681, 684-5.
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(1921), 196 Pac 667; Sza/c v. (1923), 215 Pac 347;
v. Aa/c o/ (1930), 289 Pac
1018.
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From 1905 to 1927, the Court applied the same 
logic to deny private power companies the right to 
condemn land for damsites and reservoirs. Since they 
were producing electricity fbr commercial sale, either 
to private industry or to the public without public 
service obligations, they could not justifiably be 
given such legal privileges. 24
Irrigators got different treatment, however. In 1904 
the Court confirmed the second statute without a blink, 
and in 1910 even extended the privilege to a private 
land .specw/atiOK company; it was "immaterial" that 
the investors were speculating in canal systems rather 
than planning to actually raise crops, because "irrig­
ation will promote the public good." The Court ex­
plained, in stark contrast to its earlier reasoning:
"The benefit to the public which supports the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes 
of this character, is not public service, but is the de­
velopment of the resources of the state, and the in­
crease of its wealth generally, by which its citizens 
incidentally reap a benefit."
This distinction was legally (if not economically) 
justified by the "vast difference between the use of 
water for manufacturing [i.e. power] and for irrig­
ation. In the latter case there is no choice of means or 
location....Not so with a manufacturing plant. The 
choice of location or motive power is one of economy 
or convenience at most." 25
This judicial policy continued into the 1920s, re­
ceiving an added boost from the 1917 Water Code, 
which granted broad eminent domain powers "in­
cluding the right and power to condemn an inferior 
use of water for a superior use." 26 in conflicts be­
tween irrigation and hydroelectric power, the Court 
considered the former to be "superior." 27
This attitude finally changed in 1927, by which 
time hydroelectric power had assumed new econ­
omic significance and State intervention was be­
coming politically more acceptable. When a private 
utility sought to condemn land to enlarge its reservoir 
at Lake Chelan in the eastern Cascades, planning to 
sell some of the electricity to private industry, the 
lower court followed the established precedents and 
denied the request. But the State Supreme Court over­
ruled this decision "in view of the changed conditions 
of society." In the 22 years since the earlier decisions, 
it ruled:
"We have seen the uses [of electricity] multiplied 
a thousandfold, until there is scarcely an industry of 
any kind that has hot felt the beneficial influence of 
electrical energy, and it can almost be said that its use 
is uni versal.... [Therefore,] /Ac aw of e/ecp/c exergy 
for o#pxrpoyey ¿y a pxM/c aye."
Noting that the state had created a Public Service 
Commission in 1911 to regulate private utilities' rates 
and services, the Court continued:
"The unfettered and untrammeled development 
[of water power]...is a thing much to be desired, and 
when this can be accomplished through public control 
and regulation... no decision of this court should 
stand in the way. The vanguard of progress moves 
steadily onward."
b) D/rec/ goverwHexM/ ór/ga/íox
These evolving judicial policies reflected the chang­
ing political and economic context. The state gov­
ernment actively supported irrigation development 
from 1889, mainly through its authorization and sub­
sidy of special "irrigation districts." These districts 
were an attempt to promote capital investment while 
avoiding private monopolies, following the California 
model of a few years earlier (Pisani, 1984): they were 
local, quasi-public organizations formed voluntarily 
by local property owners in order to build, expand 
and maintain irrigation systems. The legislature 
granted these organizations several important legal 
privileges, including the power to use eminent 
domain, to tax their members, and to raise capital 
through the sale of public bonds (Department of Con­
servation and Development, 1987). Unfortunately, the 
success of those bond issues depended on the dis­
tricts' financial condition, which like the rest of the
re/ CAe/an ¿7ec//7c Company p. 5aper/or Coar/ of 
CAe/an Coon/y (1927), 253 Pac 115, 117-119 (emphasis added). 
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24 The key decisions were S/o/e ex' re/ Tacoma Z/trA/^r/a/ 
Company r. WMc R/yer Power Company (1905), 82 Pac 150; 
&a/e ex re/ T/arr/î y. Sopcr/or Coorf of T/nosion Cot//;/)' (1906), 
85 Pac 666.
25 WeeJ r. GooJwm (1904), 78 Pac 36; Aa/e re/ Ga/6raM y. 
Swperior Co orí of 5poAane Co/rniy (1910), 110 Pac 429, 433-4. 
The last quotation is from Tacoma Zudas/r/a/ (see footote 24 
above).
2^This grant was remarkably broad, giving "any person...the 
right of eminent domain to acquire any property or rights... 
necessary for the storage of water for, or the application of water 
to, any beneficiai use" (Section 4 of the Water Code).
27 See, for exampie, State e.r re/ ÆeHoewtcÀ* /rr/^aí/on /lÍTír/ct v. 
Superior Coar/ /or Wa//a Wa//a Coo/Uy (1922), 204 Pac 1.
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agricultural sector was weak for most of the state's 
first half-century.
To save the districts from collapse and prevent 
serious Social and political unrest in eastern Washing­
ton, the legislature had to intervene year after year 
with direct subsidies and purchase of bonds, as well 
as continual financial reorganization. These concerns 
far outweighed the districts' actual construction acti­
vities. 30 The financial pressures also induced the 
state, from 1915 to 1933, reluctantly to give the dis­
tricts increasing rights to develop and sell electricity 
to help meet expenses. The same pattern was evident 
in the state's plans for a major public irrigation pro­
ject in the Columbia Basin: beginning in 1919 it pro­
moted a design with a small and incidental amount of 
power generation, rejecting an alternative in which 
hydroelectric power was a central component. It 
changed its mind only in the late 1920s in order to 
match the Federal government's growing emphasis on 
hydropower. 31
Federal involvement in irrigation projects simi­
larly came almost 30 years earlier than in hydro­
power. In 1902 the U.S. Congress passed the 
Reclamation Act 32 in response to several decades of 
disappointing private irrigation development (i.e., 
land reclamation). This Act set up a new government 
agency, the Reclamation Service, to plan and build 
irrigation projects, which were financed by the na­
tional budget but which were to be repaid by the far­
mers who were the beneficiaries. In Washington, the 
valleys east of the Cascade Mountains became the 
sites of several major Federal projects, chosen be­
cause of good soils and climate, proven agricultural 
productivity, and access to railroads. These projects 
accounted for nearly half of the state's expansion of 
irrigated acreage in 1900-1910, and nearly 100% of 
its irrigation storage capacity by 1920 (Coulter, 1951; 
Fahey, 1986). Unfortunately, low crop prices and high 
irrigation costs, in Washington and throughout the 
Western states, prevented farmers from repaying the 
Reclamation Service, which needed continuing infu­
sions of cash from an unwilling Congress. Thus, the 
Service was on the verge of financial collapse in the 
1920s (Gates, 1968).
c) Direct governmental involvement; /jyJroeZec- 
trtcity
State and Federal involvement in hydroelectric devel­
opment was limited and controversial until the late 
1920s, as "public [electric] power" came to symbolize 
the larger political conflict over the proper role of 
government in the U.S. economy. In Washington 
State, however, there was an important "public power" 
movement at the local level. Soon after 1900 the 
state's two biggest cities, Seattle and Tacoma, created 
municipal utilities to produce energy -almost entirely 
hydroelectric- for public consumption and to contrib­
ute income to the city governments. These enterprises 
competed with private utilities inside city limits and 
became important symbols of public service in the 
early 20th century Progressive reform movement 
(Dodds, 1986; MacColl, 1979). By 1920 the two utilities 
produced 25% of the state's total hydropower^ and 
continued to expand and build new dams, arguing for 
the right to provide service beyond city limits. They 
were backed by a coalition of urban Progressives, la­
bour unions, and farmers (some of the latter were 
populists and some were simply frustrated at the pri­
vate utilities' failure to provide rural services). In 1923 
they got a bill to this effect passed by the legislature 
and it was sent to a public referendum for approval.
The municipal utilities were bitterly attacked by 
private power companies, which produced the re­
maining 75% of the state's hydropower. Iwo of these 
companies were most important, one in eastern Wash­
ington and one in the west, each of which produced 
more than the city utilities combined. The private 
companies complained of unfair competition, since 
the city utilities were exempt both from paying taxes 
and from regulation by the Public Service Com­
mission. Together with other business interests and 
political conservatives, the private utilities organized
1917-1920, Stale Hydraulic Engineer. 
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39See Clark, 1976; Dodds, 1986, Fahey, 1986. The only pros­
perous periods resulted from the Federal irrigation projects in 
1905-1909 (see below) and the brief boom during World War 1. 
From 1920 to 1938, irrigated acreage rose only 11%, well under 
1% per year. See the of the State Hydraulic
Engineer and Department of Conservation and Development, 
1918-1946.
^This is evident both in the statutes passed during this period 
and the ¿Fc/t/Ecd of the State Reclamation Board.
For the irrigation districts this was first mentioned as a 
supplemental measure in a 1915 law (Chap. 179), though it was 
not until 1927 that they were authorized to use power sales to 
underwrite and repay bonds (State Reclamation Act, Chap. 254). 
On the Columbia Basin project, see Harding, 1954, as well as 
Laws of 1919, Chap. 60, Laws of 1927, Chap, 260, and Laws of 
1933, Chap. 81.
33 This Act concerned the reclamation of land by means of water 
development projects. Henceforth, this activity will be referred 
to as "land reclamation".
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a massive publicity campaign against the bill, warn­
ing of a dangerous increase in governmental power 
and a threat to individual freedom, and thus suc­
ceeded in defeating the referendum (Fahey, 1986; 
Ficken, 1979).
Nonetheless, throughout the 1920s public power 
remained a hot political issue. As the economy dete­
riorated and state finances came under severe press­
ure, total hydroelectric capacity nearly doubled and 
continued to rise, becoming an increasingly strategic 
and attractive policy concern. Finally in 1930, 
when the Great Depression had already begun, Wash­
ington voters approved a second and broader referen­
dum, despite a similar opposition campaign warning 
of "socialism" (Washington Water Power Company, 
1952). The new law authorized county-sized "Public 
Utility Districts" (PUDs), analogous to irrigation dis­
tricts, which could produce and distribute electricity, 
issue bonds, levy taxes, and exercise eminent domain 
powers to condemn or force a linkage with private 
generation and distribution facilities (Laws of 1931, 
Chap. 31). The principle of public ownership and 
control was thus established, though for some years 
the economy remained too weak to allow any new 
development.
It was the Federal government's commitment to 
hydropower that eventually transformed Washington's 
economy and opened a nationwide era of large-scale, 
multiple-use water development. Federal policy was 
of decisive importance both because Federal law con­
trolled all navigable waters -and thus the bigger ri­
vers- and because many of the nation's most 
promising water-power sites, especially in the West­
ern states, were on public lands. But deep political 
disagreement within Congress over the nature of the 
government's role created a stalemate for nearly 20 
years, until finally the 1920 Water Power Act found a 
compromise, allowing Federal agencies to plan and 
build power dams but requiring them to lease the fa­
cilities to private utilities for the energy production 
itself (Hays, 1959).
Even so there was little actual development until 
the economic crisis of the 1930s, when part of Presi­
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" included 
massive public works projects that were intended 
both to provide public employment and to fuel re­
gional economic development. Tb achieve the latter 
goal, Federal agencies drew on the hard lessons of 
previous decades by making hydroelectricity the cen­
tral element in multiple-purpose water projects; in 
this "cash register dam" strategy, power revenues 
were used to subsidize less economically viable water 
uses such as irrigation, Rood control, and recreation. 
The Bureau of Reclamation (the new name of the 
Reclamation Service), in particular, followed this 
strategy to save itself from being abolished, thereby 
entering upon several decades of bureaucratic growth 
and prosperity, even though irrigation remained its 
official purpose (Gates, 1968; Swain, 1970).
In Washington the Federal government built two 
big dams in the 1930s, named Bonneville and Grand 
Coulee, both on the Columbia River in the eastern 
part of the state. Finished in 1937 and 1941, respec­
tively, they more than trebled the state's total power 
production. 35 The Bonneville Power Administration 
(BRA), an independent Federal agency, was estab­
lished in 1937 to stimulate regional economic devel­
opment by distributing this huge energy surplus, 
using and expanding the existing transmission net­
work, and encouraging public consumption by offer­
ing voy low wholesale prices to Public Utility Districts, 
municipal utilities, and rural electric cooperatives. The 
PUDs were thus relieved of the capital-intensive burden 
of production, allowing them to expand rapidly for 
the first time since they had been authorized in 1931 
and even take over some existing private distribution 
facilities (Pacific Northwest Public Power Records 
Survey, 1981; Washington Water Power Company, 
1952). The BRA became a major symbol of both Presi­
dent Roosevelt and the New Deal, representing the 
crucial role of government in boosting economic and 
social welfare, and providing a standard of compari­
son for the rates, services and operations of the pri­
vate utilities. 3^ At the time, however, there was no 
demand for such large quantities of energy, and the 
need to stimulate both distribution and consumption 
soon led the BPA to work closely with ^rivate utilities 
and sell them power at the same wholesale prices.
35 Tota} state production rose from 2.9 biliion kwh in 1935 to 
10.0 binion in 1943, almost entirety attributabie to those two 
dams. State Pianning Councii, Report, 1934-44.
3*5  The BPA's first director was a ieadíng figure in the regionai 
"pubiic power movement," who had directed the dramatic expan­
sion of Seattie City Light for 25 years; at his death he was 
described as a man "whose iove for mankind expressed itself in 
kilowatts" (MacCoit, 1979, p. 561).
34 Capacity increased from 380 000 to 700 000 hp between 1920 
and 1928 (84%, or more than 10% per year), and then to 
1 000 000 hp by 1936 (an additions] 43%, or more than 5% per 
year at tAe AetgAi of tAe See ZMenma/ Myottr,
1920-1936, State Department of Conservation and Development.
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The Federal dams and the BPA made possible a 
regional economic transformation during and after 
the Second World War, based on a boom in energy- 
intensive industries such as metallurgy, aluminum- 
smelting, shipyards and airplane-manufacturing. 
Dais established lasting geographic patterns and 
determined the course of water resource development 
to the present day. After the war Federal agencies 
built ten more big dams in eastern Washington 
and 15 others elsewhere in the Columbia River 
basin, in Idaho and Oregon. Some of these provided 
water for new irrigation development, including 
hundreds of thousands of acres in the Columbia Plain, 
but the first priority and driving force was electricity: 
generated in the arid Bast of the state, but mostly 
exported to western Washington and out-of-state 
(Butcher and Wandschneider, 1986). Thus, after half a 
century of statehood, Washington's economy had 





This case study offers several lessons about property 
rights and the role of the State in water resources that 
are relevant to Latin America today.
First, geographic conditions seem to have a 
less determining influence on the nature of water 
rights than is commonly believed. Although in 
Washington the debate over water rights doctrines 
was often put in terms of the climatic differences 
between the eastern and western halves of the 
state, the essential issue was the security of title 
needed to attract private capital investment. Given 
that security, regional economic dynamics were 
much more important than either the geographic 
basis of legal doctrine or the climate itself in deter­
mining the course of water resource development. 
A key illustration of this is that the hard-fought 
implementation of a Water Code supposedly de­
signed for the needs of arid-country agriculture was 
almost immediately followed by the rise to domin­
ance of water-power for urban and industrial pur­
poses -with the bulk of that energy produced in 
the arid part of the state.
Second, the nature of private property under 
capitalism is more ambiguous than either its propo­
nents or opponents often realize. The security of pri­
vate rights necessary to stimulate capital investment 
in Washington was only achieved at the expense of 
other property rights that were equally private and 
equally market-oriented, but less amenable to 
maximized economic growth or capital accumulation. 
For political, economic and social reasons, therefore, 
it may be necessary to favour some kinds of private 
property but not others, and arguments supporting one 
kind do not necessarily support another -a point 
which is usually lost in both ideological and prag­
matic debates.
Third, the evolution of the Washington water 
rights regime highlights both the historical and conti­
nuing dependence of private property and capital ac­
cumulation on State intervention. Although private 
rights to water became defined as administrative per­
mits for its use, these functioned in fact as a capitalist 
form of private property, encouraging capital invest­
ment and market-oriented economic development. 
Such a system is absolutely dependent on continued 
State maintenance of its rules, premises and practical 
necessities: resolving conflicts, gathering and keeping 
technical data and legal information, and so forth. 
Thus "property," like "the market", must not only be 
understood as a socially and collectively created in­
stitution -it must also be appreciated that it cannot 
successfully function otherwise.
Fourth, the crucial importance of State involve­
ment in both types of water development is evident. 
In Washington, both state and national governmental 
activity began as a reaction to economic conditions 
-to the stagnation of irrigated agriculture on one 
hand, and to the promise of hydroelectricity on the 
other- but once established it then became the sine 
wow of regional growth. Furthermore, the inte­
grated and multiple-purpose character of water use 
was due entirely to central governmental control.
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Finally, the property regime adopted in 
Washington -i.e., a combination of investment- 
oriented private rights with centralized State adminis­
tration and control- was able to overcome the main 
obstacles posed by water to private property (see 
section IV). The fact that water rights were still 
use-rights, and that water uses were qualitatively dif­
ferent from each other and inextricably related, did 
not prevent the establishment of institutions intended 
to fully incorporate the resource into the process of 
capitalist economic development. This effort was so 
effective that it casts doubt on the limited character of 
much of today's debate about "environmentally sus­
tainable development": if the goal is to incorporate 
the logic, qualities and relationships of ecological sys­
tems into existing political and economic models, the 
necessary institutional and structural reforms will 
have to be truly fundamental.
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